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ABSTRACT
Keying material for encryption is stored as digital bistrings in non-volatile memory
(NVM) on FPGAs and ASICs in current technologies. However, secrets stored this way
are not secure against a determined adversary, who can use probing attacks to steal the
secret. Physical Unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as an alternative. PUFs
leverage random manufacturing variations as the source of entropy for generating random
bitstrings, and incorporate an on-chip infrastructure for measuring and digitizing the
corresponding variations in key electrical parameters, such as delay or voltage. PUFs are

vi

designed to reproduce a bitstring on demand and therefore eliminate the need for on-chip
storage.
In this dissertation, I propose a kind of PUF that measures resistance variations in
inter-metal layers that define the power grid of the chip and evaluate its temperature and
voltage stability. First, I introduce two implementations of a power grid-based PUF (PGPUF). Then, I analyze the quality of bit strings generated without considering
environmental variations from the PG-PUFs that leverage resistance variations in: 1) the
power grid metal wires in 60 copies of a 90 nm chip and 2) in the power grid metal wires
of 58 copies of a 65 nm chip. Next, I carry out a series of experiments in a set of 63 chips
in IBM's 90 nm technology at 9 TV corners, i.e., over all combination of 3 temperatures:
-40OC, 25OC and 85OC and 3 voltages: nominal and +/-10% of the nominal supply
voltage. The randomness, uniqueness and stability characteristics of bitstrings generated
from PG-PUFs are evaluated. The stability of the PG-PUF and an on-chip voltage-todigital (VDC) are also evaluated at 9 temperature-voltage corners.
I introduce several techniques that have not been previously described, including a
mechanism to eliminate voltage trends or 'bias' in the power grid voltage measurements,
as well as a voltage threshold, Triple-Module-Redundancy (TMR) and majority voting
scheme to identify and exclude unstable bits.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Motivation
As electronic devices are becoming ubiquitous and interconnected around people's daily
life, security, trustworthy computing, and privacy protection have emerged over the past
decades as hardware design objectives of great significance. For many emerging
applications that need exceptional security in identifying and authenticating users, such as
intellectual property (IP) protection, system security is traditionally based on the
protection of secret keys. Conventionally, these secret keys are based on battery-backed
RAM or NVM such as ROMs, fuses, or flash/EEPROM. These secret keys need to be
well managed and stored to avoid releasing information to attackers. Over the past
several years, many kinds of attacks for exacting, estimating, or cloning secret keys that
are stored digitally in NVM have been successfully developed and reported. When the
adversaries have the full and direct access to ICs, the situation is getting especially
problematic and worse. Also, integrating a NVM for an IC incurs additional costs and
fabrication overhead.
The described problem has become more intense recently, and this motivated the
1

idea of using inherent random manufacturing variations to serve as identifiers for ICs. It
provides a promising alternative which can address the present challenges of traditional
security that were described earlier. This idea is not new and a kind of circuits called
Physical Unclonable Functions, which store secret keys in silicon circuits by exploiting
uncontrollable randomness due to manufacturing process variations, have been proposed
and successfully implemented to overcome some of the problems faced by traditional
techniques. PUFs are easy to build and can be implemented without any additional
manufacturing steps since they are based on the existing resources of physical variations
of the IC. Due to the inherent properties and advantages of PUFs, the research of them
has becoming more and more attractive in recent years.

1.2 Introduction to PUFs
When ICs are manufactured, there will be inevitable inherent process difference even
these ICs are fabricated from the same lot or wafer. Precise control over the fabrication of
IC components is becoming more difficult in advanced technology generations, resulting
in a wide range of electrical variations among and within the replicated copies of the
chip. Due to the existing manufacturing process variations, it is difficult or impossible to
create two exact ICs. A PUF is such an embedded structure that are designed to be
sensitive to variations in the printed and implanted features of wires and transistors on the
IC. Signal variations that occur within the IC are the source of entropy for the PUF.
Usually, the physical variations of manufacturing process manifest as analog
variations in the chips’ parametric properties, such as wire delay, threshold voltage.
2

Therefore, a PUF is designed to measure and 'digitize' these analog electrical variations.
When characterizing the PUF in a more understandable way, it can be considered as a
function that maps challenges to responses. The basic operation is shown in Fig. 1.1:
when a Challenge (C) is applied to the PUF, it reacts with a Response (R). And the
Challenge together with its associated response is known as Challenge-Response Pair
(CRP).

Fig. 1.1: CRP Protocol.
By applying a set of 'challenges' to the PUF, it can produce a large, ideally
exponential, set of unique bitstring, which can be considered as the fingerprint or DNA of
a chip. Since the challenges are typically 'digital' and therefore they can be generated onchip from a pseudo-random number generator such as a linear feedback shift register
(LFSR).
Nothing in manufacturing process of a chip is exact, and therefore, all fabricated
physical components, e.g., wires and transistors, on the chip vary from their nominal
characteristics. Although it is possible to measure these physical variations directly, it is
extremely difficult or impossible to do so without sophisticated process and equipment.
The analog electrical and parametric variations that result, on the other hand, can be
measured and processed more easily, and in many cases, this can be done using on-chip
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instrumentation. Many proposed PUF-based systems are defined in this manner, and
differentiated by the type of electrical and/or parametric variations they leverage. The
magnitude and stability of variations in, e.g., transient current delay, leakage, resistance,
capacitance, etc. are dependent on the technology and environment, and therefore, some
PUF systems can better meet the important criteria described above than others.

Fig. 1.2: The fingerprint of devices.
Due to the inherent and particular characteristics, PUFs are promising components
in the next generation of IC security and the bitstring generated from PUFs can be used in
security applications such as encryption, authentication, feature activation, metering, etc.
Since the bitstrings are generated on-the-fly using dedicated hardware primitives and
processing engines, and thereby avoid the need for storage in on-chip NVMs. This feature
not only improves their resilience to invasive attacks designed to steal the secret key
material, but it also reduces the cost of manufacturing the IC. The latter is true because, in
many cases, PUFs are designed using components that can be fabricated using standard
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complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) processing steps, and therefore, the
cost of integrating non-standard components, such as NVM, is eliminated. Another
important characteristic of the PUF as a next generation security mechanism is its
potential for generating large numbers of repeatable random bits. This feature offers new
opportunities for software processes to strengthen security mechanisms, for example, by
allowing frequent rekeying in encrypted communication channels and by allowing a
large, changing set of shared keys to be utilized among multiple communicating entities.
From the above description of PUFs, we know PUFs can provide security
advantages over traditional key generation mechanisms because they are volatile and
very difficult to clone. Unfortunately, the analog nature of the underlying random
variable make the PUF sensitive to environmental variations such as temperature and
power supply noise. For some important applications such as keys for encryption, they
require that the PUF must produce the same bit string for a fixed challenge under varying
environment. Therefore, in order to effectively move from theoretical exercises to
commercial products, the 'quality' of the bitstring produced can be measured against
many statistical metrics, but needs to meet three important criteria: 1) the bit string is
unique for each chip, and thereby able to distinguish each chip in the population, 2) the
bit string is random for each chip, and therefore is difficult or impossible to model and
predict by an adversary, and 3) the bit string is stable, i.e., it remains constant for a given
chip over time, and under varying environmental conditions. A PUF that is able to meet
these requirements can be used in applications related to security including system
identification, key generation for encryption, authentication via CRPs, IP protection,
5

remote service etc.
In this dissertation, Inter-chip hamming distance (HD) is used to determine the
uniqueness of the bitstrings among the population of chips. Similarly, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical test suite is used to evaluate the
randomness of the bitstrings produced by each chip. And intra-chip HD can be used to
evaluate stability of the bitstrings, i.e., the ability of each chip to reproduce the same
bitstring time-after-time, under varying temperature and voltage conditions.

1.3 Contributions
In this dissertation, I investigate two implementations of a PUF that measures resistance
variations in metal wires that define the power grid of the chip, and we call it PG-PUF.
There are several benefits of the PG-PUF. First, resistance of metal wires varies linearly
with temperature and can easily be designed to be resistant to aging effects such as
electromigration. Second, resistance can be measured using a simple direct current (DC)
process, which can improve signal-to-noise significantly over PUFs that leverage
alternating current (AC) characteristics, such s delay. Third, metal components are
ubiquitous on a chip, with the power grid consuming a large fraction of the metal
resources, e.g., 15-25% is typical in most commercial power grid designs. Fourth, the
power grid is a stacked structure, offering a 3rd dimension in which to leverage entropy.
Last, the interconnected structure of the wires in the power grid complicates the
interaction among variations in resistance that occur, thereby increasing the complexity
of model building attacks.
6

In order to fully leverage metal resistance variations, I design a PUF that can
measure them in each of the metal layers of the power grid. In order to reduce bias issues
and correlations that exist in the V DD and GND grids, inter-metal layer voltage
drops/rises, which are computed by subtracting the voltages measured from consecutive
metal layers, are introduced. By this method, the independent resistance variations that
occur in each of the metal layers of the power grid can be leveraged.
First, the experiments are carried out on a set of chips fabricated in IBM's 90nm, 9
metal layer bulk silicon process, and on a set of 65 nm chips fabricated in IBM's siliconon-insulator (SOI) process at room temperature. The quality of the bit strings are
evaluated using inter-chip and intra-chip HD, as well as a suite of statistical tests
available from NIST [1].
Then, I focus on determining the temperature and voltage (TV) stability of the PGPUF. A significant benefit of using metal structure is that “noise-related” variations, such
as those introduced by TV variations, result in linear changes to the measured voltages.
This linear scaling characteristic allows the relative magnitude of two voltages to remain
consistent across changes in temperature and voltage, which, in turn, improves the
stability of the PUF to bit-flips, when compared for example to PUFs which leverage
transistor-based variations. In the experiments, I evaluate the PG-PUF at 9 TV corners, i.
e., over all combinations of 3 temperatures; -40 oC, 25oC, 85oC, and 3 voltages; nominal
and +/-10% of nominal. The evaluation is carried out on a set of chips fabricated in IBM's
90 nm, 9 metal layer bulk silicon bulk silicon process. The stability of the bitstring is
measured using intra-chip HD and 'probability of failure' techniques. Randomness and
7

uniqueness are also evaluated using NIST test suite and inter-chip HD methods.
I also investigate an on-chip voltage-to-digital converter (VDC) for measuring
voltage variations (which reflect resistance variations in the metal wires) and its stability
across the 9 TV corners. The VDC is used to digitize the voltage drops produced from
each metal layer of the power grid.
Besides, I introduce several noise resilient bit-flip avoidance schemes, which are
used to reduce the probability of a failure to reproduce the bitstring to less than 1E-9
under varying environmental variations. One technique is called thresholding mechanism,
which derives a voltage threshold from a chip's voltage drop distribution profile that is
used to decide whether a given voltage comparison generate a strong bit or a weak bit.
The second scheme is a bitstring replication method that mimics a popular scheme used
in fault tolerance called Triple-Module-Redundancy (TMR). TMR is proposed for fixedlength bitstrings that can further improve the stability of the bitstrings. Although these
techniques discard a large fraction of bits, they provide several advantages and can be
used as an alternative to error correction and Helper Data schemes [2][3]. The helper data
(public data) associated with these methods reveals nothing about the secret bitstring
since every bit is independent from others. Also, the helper data is simple data for both of
these techniques and its size can be easily reduced by using a certain compression
technique. What's more, these methods increase the difficulty of model-building since
bitstrings are constructed using only a subset of the possible voltage pairings. However,
for error correction scheme, the complex algorithm implementation will require
significant resources and overhead. And also the error correction scheme will release
8

some secret information. Therefore, both the thresholding and TMR are easier and
cheaper to implement on chip when compared with the error correction schemes. That's
the main reason we avoid using the error correction scheme to fix unstable bits issues for
PUFs. In this dissertation, both techniques are demonstrated to provide a significant
improvement to inter-chip HD and the results obtained from NIST statistical tests.

1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 1, the motivation of using PUFs for security applications is briefly
described. Then the basic idea of PUFs and their advantages over conventional methods
are given. Finally, the requirements for PUFs in order to be used for practical security
applications and some methods of evaluating the quality of them are discussed.
In Chapter 2, the development of definition for PUFs are described. Then the
previous work about PUFs and classification of the popular PUFs are covered. Also, the
applications of PUFs are discussed. Besides, several statistical methods for evaluating the
quality of bitstrings generated from PG-PUFs are briefly described. Finally, some
techniques used to improve the stability of PUFs are given.
In Chapter 3, two implementations of PG-PUFs for both IBM 90 nm and 60 nm
technologies are introduced and experiments are carried out without considering
environmental variations. The output bitstrings are analyzed and evaluated by using interchip HD, intra-chip HD and NIST tests suite.
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In Chapter 4, experiments are carried out across different temperatures and voltages
in order to evaluate the stability of PG-PUFs against environmental variations. Several
methods of improving the stability of PG-PUFs are demonstrated. The quality of
bitstrings are also evaluated using statistical tests.
In Chapter 5, some future work is proposed.
Finally, the findings and contributions of this dissertation are concluded.

10

Chapter 2
Background
Study on manufacturing process variations and PUFs has been gaining increasing interest
and attention since the concept of PUFs was firstly introduced in [4]. Over the past
couple of years, the attention on PUFs has risen substantially, making them a hot topic in
the field of hardware security and leading to an expansion of published results. This
chapter will provide an overview of PUFs. The basic definition will be given in Section
2.1, different types of PUFs will be classified in Section 2.3, many important
applications will be discussed in Section 2.4. At the end of this chapter, several methods
used for evaluating the quality of PUFs will be listed. And many techniques used to
improve the stability of PUFs are also discussed.

2.1 Definition of PUFs
It is widely accepted that the significance and complexity of process variations is
increasing as technologies are aggressively scaled [5][6]. The idea of using these
manufacturing process variations as identifiers for ICs has showed up for a long time.
However, the concept of PUFs didn't appear until recent years. There have already been
several proposals for the definition of required PUF properties. Firstly, they were called
11

Physical One-Way Function [4], and later renamed to Physical Random Functions [7],
but eventually resolved to Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). The exact definition
for this kind of circuits is still under discussion. The most popular definition of PUFs is
described in [8] by Gassend et al.:
“A physical Random Function (PUF) is a function that maps challenges to responses that
is embodied by a physical device, and that verifies the following properties:
•

Easy to evaluate: The physical device is easily capable of evaluating the
function in a short amount of time.

•

Hard to predict: From a polynomial number of plausible physical
measurements, an attacker who no longer has the device, and who can only
use a polynomial amount of resources can only extract a negligible amount of
information about the responses to a random chosen challenge.”

There are also other descriptions of PUFs, e.g., in [9], the authors described that
“Physical Unclonable Functions consist of inherently unclonable physical systems. They
inherit their unclonability from the fact that they consist of many random components
that are present in the manufacturing process and cannot be controlled. When a stimulus
is applied to the system, it reacts with a response”.

2.2 PUF Extensions
From the description in section 1.2, we know that PUF is a function that can map
challenges to responses. Therefore, according to how many CRPs different PUFs can
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generate with the same hardware resources, there are two different situations: strong
PUFs and weak PUFs. Usually, Strong PUFs can produce an exponential number of
CRPs which are more difficult for attackers to model and learn, while weak PUFs only
have a linear number of them. Besides trying to generate as many CRPs as possible,
people have also developed some other methods to increase the security of PUFs. Some
people use pre-processing or post-processing schemes to obtain more robust bitstrings.
Some people combine PUFs with a particular algorithm which can make model-building
attacks more difficult. In the following part, I will discuss more details on how to obtain
these improvements.

2.2.1 Controlled PUFs
The concept of Controlled PUFs or (CPUFs) was introduced by Gassend et al. in [2],
which combine a PUF with other primitives. The CPUFs can only be accessed via an
algorithm that is physically bound to the PUF in an inseparable way, and any attempt to
break the link between the PUF and the algorithm will definitely lead to the destruction
of the PUF. Therefore, by using controls to the PUFs, it is possible to make a PUF more
robust and reliable. In [7], the authors summarized several controls that can be placed
around the PUF to improve its function. Fig. 2.1 shows the full details of these controls.

Fig. 2.1: Using controls to improve a PUF[7].
13

2.2.2 Reconfigurable PUFs
In 2009, the authors in [10] defined a new primitive, called reconfigurable PUF (rPUF).
The rPUF is a PUF with a mechanism, which can transform the original PUF into a new
PUF with a new unpredictable and uncontrollable challenge-response behavior.
Meanwhile, the rPUF can still preserve all the security properties of the original PUF. In
this literature, two practical instantiations of rPUFs were presented. One is based on the
optical PUF. When the structure of the optical PUF is irradiated with a laser beam outside
the normal operating conditions, the structure will change its internal configuration. This
change will cause a rearrangement of the optical scatters, which will lead to a completely
new random CRP behavior. Another is based on phase change memory. By rewriting the
memory cells, a new random CRPs can also be generated .
Later in 2011, more novel structures of the reconfigurable PUFs were discussed in
[11]. The first method is adding reconfigurable elements before the challenges applied to
the PUF, while the original properties and performance of the PUF will still be preserved;
another idea is to add extra reconfigurable components to process the output before using
it as an authentication key. The authors in the literature also stated that instead of only
making CPRs reconfigurable by processing the challenge and responses directly, they can
also alter the main PUF circuit to update the challenge-response behavior.

2.3 PUF Implementations
Since the introduction of concept of PUFs, many studies on PUFs have been reported.
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There have been a large variety of PUF implementations, and the list still keeps getting
larger. In this section, I will mainly discuss the following several types of PUFs: 1) Nonelectronic PUF. (2) Delay-based PUF. (3) Memory-based PUF. (4) Power-grid PUF. 5)
Misc Category.

2.3.1 Non-Electronic PUFs
An earlier non-electronic PUF is a so-called optical PUF [4], which use microscopic
refractive glass spheres in a small transparent epoxy plate. It is stimulated using a heliumneon laser and the speckle pattern represents the response. The basic implementation and
operation of an optical PUF is shown in Fig. 2.2 [12]. It is obvious that the optical PUF
has a really complex structure and therefore cannot be used for large scale production.

Fig. 2.2: Basic operation of an optical PUF [12].
In [13], the authors introduced a technique which can make use of the reflection of
a focused laser beam by the irregular fiber structure of a paper document. The particular
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pattern of the reflection can be used as fingerprint of that paper and therefore can be used
as anti-counterfeiting strategy for currency notes. In [14], the authors proposed a new
technique for exacting unique fingerprints from identical CDs. It was observed that the
manufacturing variations of the lengths of lands and pits on a regular CD are large
enough to be measured from the electrical signal of the photodetector in a regular CD
player. In [15], a kind of PUFs called magnetic PUFs were introduced, which use the
inherent uniqueness of the particular patterns in magnetic media, e.g., for credit cards.
Other non-electronic PUFs including RF-DNA [16] and acoustical PUFs [17] were also
proposed.

2.3.2 Delay-Based PUFs
Delay-based PUFs utilize the variations in propagation delay of identical circuits to
derive a secret response. There are mainly two popular types of delay-based PUFs: arbiter
PUFs and ring oscillator (RO) PUFs.
The basic idea of the arbiter PUF was proposed in [18][19], which exploits the
statistical delay variations of wires and transistors across ICs to introduce a digital race
condition on two paths on a chip and to be implemented with an arbiter to decide which
path won the race. The basic structure of the arbiter PUFs is shown in Fig. 2.3. In this
structure, a sequence of switches is connected in series and each of them is controlled by
one bit of the challenge. At the end, an arbiter decides which path is faster and assigns a
digital '1' or '0' accordingly. In real world, the two delay paths are 'lay-out' in an identical
fashion. However, due to the uncontrollable manufacturing processing variations, the
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delays of these two delay paths vary randomly across different chips, which can allow the
generation of unique responses for every IC.

Fig. 2.3: Basic operation of an arbiter PUF [12]

From the structure of the arbiter PUF, it is known that the total delay of the chain
should be the sum of the delay of the separate blocks. Therefore, the arbiter PUF is
susceptible to model-building attacks. By observing a number of CPRs, the attackers can
build a mathematical model of the PUF that predicts the response to an unseen challenge.
In order to make the model-building attacks to the arbiter PUF more difficult, in [19], a
feed-forward arbiter PUF was depicted as shown in Fig. 2.4. In this structure, multiple
challenge bits are determined by the racing result in intermediate stages instead of being
provided by a user as that for the basic arbiter PUFs [8][18]. Since the internal feedforward bits are hidden to an adversary, it is difficult to build a precise model of a feedforward arbiter PUF.
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Fig.2.4: Feed-forward arbiter scheme for improved security [19].
However, experimental results from literatures [20] show that with more advanced
modeling techniques it is still possible to build an accurate model for the feed-forward
arbiter PUF. More advanced architectures were proposed in [11][21]. In [21], the authors
developed a new set of techniques for FPGA-based PUF design and implementation,
which use reconfigurable structure to eliminate some of the classical arbiter-based PUF
limitations and make them more resistant to modeling.
Also, note that arbiters in practice are implemented by D flip-flops. When the
absolute delay difference of the arriving signals is smaller than its setup and hold time,
which results in metastability and high sensitivity to environmental variations. In order to
solve these problems, Devadas et al. in [22] introduced a new arbiter-based PUF structure
that exploits programmable delay lines (PDL) to tune and cancel out the delay skews
caused by asymmetries in routing on FPGAs. The authors in this literature also stated that
there is still other direction of improving the security of arbiter-based PUFs, which is by
reducing noise probability in PUF responses. Further, a PDL-based symmetric switch
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structure was also introduced to resolve the routing issues.
Another type of delay-based PUFs is called Ring-Oscillator PUF (RO-PUF). The
basic structure of a RO-PUF is proposed in [7] as shown in Fig. 2.5. An AND gate in the
loop allows to enable/disable the oscillation. As introduced in [7], the RO-PUF uses a
different approach towards measuring small random delay deviations caused by
manufacturing variability. The source of this randomness is again the uncontrollable
effect of process variations on the delay of digital components. The basic idea of ROPUF is to connect the output of the delay chain (that for the Arbiter PUFs) to the input
and measure the frequency (instead of delay).

Fig.2.5: Basic Ring-Oscillator PUF circuit proposes in [7].
However, the RO-PUF suffers from the systematic or correlated process variation
and the environmental noise caused by the voltage and temperature variations, which
degrade the uniqueness and the stability of PUF responses [12]. There have been many
effective solutions trying to improve the performance of RO-PUFs [23][24][25]. In [23],
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the authors presented a temperature-ware cooperative RO-PUF implementation to reduce
the hardware cost. In [24], Maiti et al. proposed a compensation method to mitigate the
negative influence of systematic process variations. The method is as follows: firstly
place the group of ring oscillators as close as possible to each other, and secondly pick
the physically adjacent pair of ROs while evaluating a responses bit. Also, they
introduced a novel configurable ring oscillator technique, which can drastically reduce
the effect of noise on PUF responses. In [26], Mansouri et al. introduced a new type of
RO-PUF. In this structure, the inverters composing the ring oscillators can be supplied by
independent voltages. The authors stated that this basic concept can be used to design
temperature-aware RO-PUFs, whose output bits do not depend on the operating
temperature. Therefore, the reliability of the PUF is improved to temperature variations.
Also, an improved RO-PUF called reconfigurable PUF with a mechanism to update
its challenge-Response pairs was proposed in [10]. This PUF preserves the properties of
original PUF but has unpredictably different challenge-Response behaviors after every
reconfiguration.
For all the delay-based PUFs, they are based on the delay variations and
propagation time comparison or rings oscillator frequency comparisons. There exist
contest that these delays or frequencies are too similar to decide the response. Based on
this contest, the Grenoble INP team in [27] developed a PUF based on asynchronous
communication in order to generate violation depending of flip-flop set-up time. When a
synchronous design does not respect the setup time, this can induce metastability in the
circuit (a “quasi-stable” state which will be resolved either by '0' state or by '1' state in
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an undefined time).
Besides these two popular types of delay-based PUFs, in [28], a new delay-based
PUF architecture called glitch PUF was proposed, which exploits glitches that behave
non-linearly from delay variation between gates and the characteristic of pulse
propagation of each gate. The authors presented a method to accurately acquire the
waveforms and to convert them into response bits and also evaluate the characteristics of
glitch PUF. This structure is expected to solve the current problem of delay-based PUF
that it is easy to predict the relation between delay information and generated
information.

2.3.3 Memory-Based PUFs
In this section, another popular type of PUFs that leverage the bi-stability characteristics
of memory primitives will be listed. It is implemented by putting a memory cell into an
metastable state and then releasing it. In most cases, digital memory cells heavily prefer
one of the two stable states. However, in some cases, meta-stability results, which results
in oscillations between stable states and non-deterministic settling times.There have
shown several kinds of memory-based PUFs such as Static Random-Access Memory
(SRAM) PUFs [29][30][31], Butterfly PUFs [32], Flip-flop PUFs [33], Latch PUFs [34].
In [29], the authors provided the first construction of an intrinsic PUF based on
SRAM memory randomness. The typical SRAM PUF is implemented with six transistors
(MOSFETs) as shown in Fig. 2.6, and formed of two cross-coupled inverters and two
access transistors connecting to the data bit-lines based on the word-line signal. In the
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same year, a very similar concept was also presented in [30].

Fig.2.6: Six transistor SRAM cell [29].
Later in the year of 2008, the authors of [32] proposed a new PUF structure called
Butterfly PUF that can be used on all types of FPGAs. The structure of the butterfly PUF
is as shown in Fig.2.7, constructed as symmetrically as possible by manual routing of the
signal wires. It consists of two latches, each with a preset signal and a clear signal. The
data signal is transferred to the output when the CLK is high. The stable state of the
butterfly PUF depends on the slight differences in the delays of the connecting wires
which are designed using symmetrical paths on the FPGA matrix.
The authors in [35] introduced an SRAM PUF which they implemented on a
microcontroller using the internal SRAM block. In [33], the authors proposed a so-called
flip-flops PUF, which is based on the power-up behavior of regular flip-flops. The
experimental results in this literature show that this flip-flop PUFs is equivalent to the
previous proposed SRAM PUFs. The authors stated that the flip-flops PUFs have some
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advantages with regard to the use in reconfigurable devices.

Fig.2.7: Butterfly PUF: cross-coupled latches[32].
In [36], the authors presented detailed evaluations of 90 nm 6T-SRAM as PUF for
secure key generation in wireless sensor nodes. In order to put SRAM PUF in low-power
security applications, a design for using a 65 nm 10T sub-threshold SRAM as a PUF was
proposed in [37]. In this design, significant improvements are achieved in power
consumption and security over existing designs. Experimental results show that this
design is suitable for ultra-low power security applications since it have more than 50%
of uniqueness and near 100% reliability with a 60% of power saving.
These memory-based PUFs are reasonably resistant to model-attacks compared to
the delay-Based PUFs as their responses are based on independent random elements. But
the memory-based PUFs grow with overheads (size) exponentially related to the length of
their challenges.
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2.3.4 Power Grid-Based PUFs
The power grid-based PUF (PG-PUF) was firstly proposed in [38], which is based on the
resistance variations in the power grid of a chip. There are two strategies for the PGPUFs in this paper: one is based on voltage drops, and another is based on equivalent
resistance. Voltage drops and equivalent resistances in the power distribution system are
measured using external instruments and it is again observed that these electrical
parameters are affected by random manufacturing variability.
The authors in [38] also stated that there are many advantages using process
variations of power grid as PUFs. Firstly, the PG-PUFs is based on the variations in only
passively components of the IC, specifically the power grid, and is therefore less
susceptible to environmental variations. Secondly, because the power grid is an existing
distributed resource in every design, the overhead of the PG-PUFs is lower than other
kind of PUFs.

2.3.5 Misc Category
In the year of 2011, many novel PUFs showed up [39][40][41][42][43]. In [39], the
authors presented PUF circuits designed to exploit inherent fluctuations in physical
layout, called litho-PUFs. Variations arising from proximity effects, density effects, etch
effects, and non-rectangularity of transistors are leveraged to implement lithographybased PUFs. And the authors showed that the uniqueness level of these PUFs are
adjustable and are typically much higher than traditional ring-oscillator or tri-state buffer
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based approaches. In [40], the authors proposed a PUF called PE-PUF. This PUF takes
into account process variations, temperature, power supply noise and crosstalk, which are
major sources of variations and noise in ICs. In [41], the authors introduced a new class
of dynamic PUF (DPUF) that employs dynamic system alteration with respect to
individual gate speeds, enabling each user to create his own PUF as needed. The authors
stated that this DPUF has very high unpredictability and can easily be stabilized. The
authors in [42] presented a PUF called Bi-stable Ring PUF. The basic idea of it is based
on the fact that an inverter ring consisting of an even number of inverters has two
possible stable states. The PUF proposed in [43] is built using leakage sensors with each
measuring the leakage current of a transistor. When compared with a popular ring
oscillator PUF architecture of the same entropy, the authors stated that this proposed PUF
consumes about 80% less power, occupies about 85% less area, and has a high level of
stability across a wide range of temperature. Very recently, the authors in [44] used the
Buskeeper as a PUF, and gave experimental results showing that the Buskeeper PUF can
be considered as a good alternative to D flip-flop PUFs since the Buskeeper PUF are
much more efficient than D flip-flops in regard to the amount of hardware resources
required while they can maintain the performance as well as the already and generally
accepted ones. In [45], J. Aarestad et al. introduced a new PUF called the HardwareEmbedded Delay PUF, or HELP, which leverages the natural variations that occur in the
path delays of a core micro on a chip to create an unique, stable, and random bistring of
virtually any length.
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2.4 Applications of PUF
PUFs have shown great promise in many security applications such as IC identification
[7][46][47][48], generating unique keys for encryption [49][50], authentication [8][47]
[51][52], IP protection on FPGAs [32], RFID for anti-counterfeiting [53].
The unclonability property makes PUFs attractive for supporting anticounterfeiting technologies, in the biometric sense. Therefore, PUFs can be used to
identify and authenticate a chip. The process works by the following steps: at time '0'
(after manufacturing), a trusted entity applies a process called enrollment phase. In this
phase, a subset of challenges are applied from the much larger number of available
challenges and the challenge-Response pairs (CPRs) are stored in a secure database. This
database need to be securely managed by the trusted party, only who has knowledge of
which challenges are applied; later in the field, during the authentication process, the
trusted party apply a challenge and then check whether the response is close enough to
that in the database. After the use of the CPRs, it needs to be removed from the database
in order to avoid information release to attackers.
Secret keys are essential and important to many security applications such as IP
protection and software licensing as well as conventional ID cards and smart cards. The
response bitstrings of PUFs are proposed to integrate secret keys for the use in
cryptography. When compared to the conventional methods of storing secret keys in
NVM, PUFs have some additional security against probing and side-channel attacks: 1)
PUFs do not require a key-programming step, as is true of conventional methods; 2) the
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secret key is not generated and stored in volatile memory until it's needed. Usually, the
response bitstrings of PUFs cannot be directly used as secret key due to the
environmental noise such as temperature and supply voltage. Therefore, an intermediate
processing step is required to extract a crypto key from the responses of PUFs. I will
describe several of the popular methods used to decrease or remove the noise in the
output bitstrings of PUFs in Section 2.7.
In recent years, Intellectual Property (IP) protection of FPGA hardware designs has
gaining more attention and becoming a requirement for many IP vendors. In [54], the
authors explained why PUFs can be a very valuable technology to protect a company's IP
and present several cryptographic algorithms and protocols to use them in IP protection
applications. In [29][49], new protocols are introduced for the IP protection problem on
FPGAs based on public-key cryptography. In [32], the authors introduced the Butterfly
PUF and stated that it promises to be a significantly secure way to protect IP with no
additional costs in manufacturing.
In [55][53] , the authors stated that in order to make Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) tags resistant against many attacks, they can be linked to PUFs inseparably. The
authors demonstrated that PUFs can securely authenticate an RFID with minimal
overheads. The authors also stated the PUF-based unclonable RFIDs can be used in anticounterfeiting and security applications.

2.5 Performance Metrics of PUFs
In order to apply PUFs in security applications such as encryption key storage, unique
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device identifiers, they should possess several properties that determine the quality of
bitstrings generated by these PUFs. Mainly, there are three characteristics to evaluate
their performance. They are uniqueness, stability and randomness.

2.5.1 Uniqueness
This characteristic is used to evaluate how much one chip is different from one another. It
is the basis for PUFs to serve as identifiers. The inter-chip HD will be applied to evaluate
the uniqueness and decide how many PUF output bits are different from other PUFs. The
histogram of the inter-chip HD can be characterized as a Gaussian distribution and
summarized using an average value of μinter. The ideal inter-chip HD is 50%. Usually, the
evaluation results of proposed PUFs cannot achieve the ideal uniqueness. Some
publications have been focused on how to improve the uniqueness, e.g. in [56], the
authors proposed a novel arbitration scheme called Response Generation according to
Delay Time Measurement (RG-DTM), which divide the delay-time differences at regular
interval and decide the response by the time domains of the interleaved response 0 and 1.
In [57], the authors proposed an arbiter-based PUF circuit built on current starved
inverters, whose drain currents are set by local current mirrors. This circuit amplifies
process variations that result in great uniqueness when compared against a simple
inverter chain. The experimental results in this literature show superior performance in
uniqueness and reliability.

2.5.2 Stability (Reproducibility)
When repeatedly applying the same challenge to a PUF, ideally, the responses should
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keep the same. Also, when PUFs are used in practical implementations they can be
subjected to all kinds of environmental variations such as temperature, varying supply
voltages and different voltage ramp-up curves. To my knowledge, there is no PUF that
can avoid the 'bit flip' problem, and it must be dealt with before PUFs can be used for
encryption applications. The intra-chip HD will be used to evaluate the stability of output
bitstrings generated from PUFs.
In most literatures, the authors applied error correction or helper data schemes to
gain good reliability [2][3]. However, the overhead associated with these blocks increase
very quickly with increasing error correction capability and can become prohibitively
large for many applications. Also, these schemes require additional helper or syndrome
bits to be publicly stored, which may leak information. Recently, several new reliability
improvement methods have been presented. In [58], the authors proposed an effective
method of regenerating a finite and exact sequence of bits, which exposes response
patterns and keeps secret the particular challenge that generate response patters. The
experimental results show that this method can efficiently and reliably generate bitstrings
under extreme environmental variations.
Later in 2012, Bhargava et al. demonstrated 3 reliability enhancing techniques for
bi-stable PUF designs: directed accelerated aging (DAA), multiple evaluations (MA) and
activation control (AC) [59]. From the measured results in this literature, these three
techniques are able to reduce the percentage of unreliable bits by up to 40%, 83%, and
71% respectively.
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2.5.3 Randomness
Besides uniqueness and stability described above, it is also important to analyze the
randomness of output bitstrings generated from PUFs. Here, the NIST tests suite are
applied to test the randomness of them. In [60], the authors used the NIST tests suite to
evaluate the randomness of output strings for PUFs, resulting in excellent raw material
for key generation and for authentication. In [61], the authors stated that the amount of
randomness in the PUF output could be a significant limitation. They introduced a
method of passing the PUF response to a shift-register, and discover that the randomness
of the PUF output could be greatly increased while maintaining reliability. Also, the
authors showed experimental results that authentication with the shifted response data is
superior to that with non-shifted data.

2.6 Evaluation Methods of PUFs
2.6.1 Hamming Distance
In order to evaluate the uniqueness and stability for a PUF implementation, HD has been
introduced to measure these metrics. The test analyzes the relationship between CRPs'
HD for each PUF. The inter-chip HD and intra-chip HD are introduced to evaluate these
two metrics of PUF realizations. In order to study the statistical behavior of PUFs, all
inter-chip and intra-chip HD measurements are often combined and summarized as
histograms. In many cases, the HD histograms can be characterized as a Gaussian
distribution and summarized using a μinter and μintra and a σinter and σintra .
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For a particular challenge, the inter-chip HD between two different PUF instantiations is the distance between the two responses, resulting from applying this challenge
simultaneously to both different PUFs. The inter-chip HD, when expressed as a fraction,
the ideal value is 50%, i.e., half of the bits are different on average.
For a particular challenge, the intra-chip HD between two measurements on the
same PUF instantiation is the distance between the two responses, resulting from
applying this challenge twice to the same PUF. Intra-chip HD is strongly tied to random
noise and systematic environment variations, such as those introduced by temperature
and supply voltage. The intra-chip HD expresses the average noise in the response, and
reflects reproducibility. When expressed as a fraction, the ideal value is 0%, i.e., the bit
string can be reliably regenerated across different environmental conditions.

2.6.2 NIST SUITE
The National Institution of Standards and Technology (NIST) test suite is regarded as an
industrial standard to test cryptographic random number generator (RNGs) and recently
has been widely used to evaluate the randomness of bitstrings generated by PUFs [62]
[63]. The NIST Test Suite has totally 15 tests [1], including Frequency Test, Frequency
Test within a Block, Runs Test, Longest Run of ones in a Block, Binary Matrix Rank
Test, Discrete Fourier Transform Test, Non-overlapping Template Matching Test,
Overlapping Template Matching Test, Maurer's “Universal Statistical” Test, Linear
Complexity Test, Serial Test, Approximate Entropy Test, Cumulative Sums Test, Random
Excursions Test. For many of them, it is assumed the bit sequence is large, on order of
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103 to 107. Therefore, parameters are chosen according to NIST recommendations, e.g.,
the length of bit sequence n>100 for Frequency Test, n>38,912 for Binary Matrix Rank
Test, block length M=32 for Block Frequency Test, block length m=2 for approximate
Entropy test and block length m=5 for Serial Test.

2.7 Techniques of Improving the Stability of PUFs
2.7.1 Threshold Mechanism
For some PUFs, the response bit is generated by comparing two analog values such as
delay and voltage. When the compared two values are very similar, there exists the
possibility that they maybe cause bit flipping due to the environmental variations. For
example, in the first measurement, value1>value2; however, due to the small difference
of these two compared values and the environmental variations, in the second
measurement, it is possible that value1<value2. In this case, the bit generated by the
PUFs is considered as an unstable bit. The bistrings produced from PUFs can not be used
in the application of encryption if they contains unstable bits. As we know, people usually
use the error correction and Helper Data to deal with the bit-flipping problems of PUFs.
However, due to the additional overhead and possibility of leaking information of these
schemes, a 'threshold' mechanism can be setup and used as an alternative to deal with the
'bit-flips' to improve the stability of output bitstrings. According to the idea of the
'threshold' mechanism, when applying each challenge to PUFs and comparing two analog
values, the bits generated by those that are less than the threshold values will be
discarded.
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Therefore, the threshold mechanism should serve several primary goals: 1) it needs
to avoid bit-flipping under different environmental noise; 2) it also needs to preserve as
many strong bits as possible for each chip; 3) it should make the number of strong bits
consistent across chip.

2.7.2 Majority Voting and TMR
Majority voting is a mechanism that the final result is decided according to the majority,
that is , more than half the votes. For our PUF experiments, majority voting is the process
of collecting multiple measurements through repeatedly sampling, and determining one
output bit based on the individual value of the single measurement.
I also use a technique called Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [64] to improve
the stability of the output bitstrings. The basic principle of the TMR is fault-tolerant form
of N-modular redundancy, in which three system perform process and that result is
processed by a majority voting system to produce a single output. If any one of the three
systems fails, the other two systems can correct and mask the fault. In this dissertation, I
will apply the basic idea of TMR into the stability improvement of PG-PUFs. The process
is as follows: I investigate this technique by using fixed-length bitstrings, e.g., 256 bits. A
TMR-based bitstring is created during enrollment by copying the first 256 strong bits into
the first copy of the fixed-length bitstring. The second two copies are created by parsing
the remaining strong bits and searching for matches to the first copy. The positions of the
matching bits are indicated by writing a '1' in the public storage bitstring, while the
positions of the skipped bits are indicated by writing a '0'. Later during regeneration, the
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public storage bitstring is consulted to determine which challenges are to be used to reconstruct the 3 copies of the bitstring. Once created, the final bitstring is obtained by
majority voting on each bit.
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Chapter 3
Two Primitives of a PUF Based on
Resistance Variations in Metals

This chapter will follow the structure of our paper [65], and mainly focus on the
following several aspects. Firstly, two implementations of PUFs for both 65 nm and 90
nm technologies are described in Section 3.1. Secondly, the experimental techniques and
procedure are given in Section 3.2. Finally, the experimental results are analyzed by
statistical tests in Section 3.3.

3.1 Experimental Setup
3.1.1 Test Chip Architecture: 90 nm chips
Fig. 3.1 gives a block diagram of the 90 nm test chip architecture. The chip padframe
consists of 56 I/Os, and surrounds a chip area of approx. 1.5 mm x 1.5 mm. Four PADs
labeled PS1, PS2, NS1, NS2 along the top of the figure refer to voltage sense connections,
the 'P' version for sensing voltages near VDD and the 'N' version for voltages near GND.
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These four terminals wire onto the chip and connect to 85 copies of a Stimulus/Measure
circuit (SMC). The SMCs are distributed across the entire chip (see small rectangles) as
two arrays, a 7x7 outer array and a 6x6 inner array. Although not shown, a scan chain
connects serially to each of the SMCs to allow each of them to be controlled.

Fig. 3.1: Block diagram of 90 nm chips, with voltage sense pins along top
and two arrays of SMCs, a 7x7 outer array and a 6x6 inner
array.
The schematic diagram of the SMC is shown in Fig. 3.2. A pair of large ‘shorting
transistor’, capable of sinking approx. 10 mA of current through the power grid when
enabled, are shown along the bottom of the figure. A set of 16 ‘pseudo’ pass gates
(hereafter referred to as transmissions gates or TGs) serve as voltage sense devices. Eight
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of the TGs connect to 8 (of the 9) metal layers that define the VDD stack-up of the power
grid, as shown on the left side of Fig. 3.2, while the other 8 connect to the GND stack-up.
Scan FFs and 3-to-8 decoders allow exactly one of the pass gates to be enabled in each of
the stack-ups.

Fig. 3.2: SMC schematic in 90 nm chips.

An additional TG connects to the drains of the 8 stack-up TGs, labeled as '2' in Fig.
3.2, one for VDD and one for GND. Separate scan FFs control the connection to the chipwide wires that route to the P/NSX pins of Fig. 3.1. The configuration and control
mechanism allows any VDD and GND voltages to be measured using off-chip voltmeters.
We refer to these experiments using PG90, for power grid 90 nm chips.
A 'challenge' in our experiments is applied by configuring the scan chain to 1)
enable the shorting transistors within an SMC, and 2) enable two TGs in the same SMC,
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in particular, the TG labeled 2 in Fig. 3.2 and one from the group 1a through 1h. Once
enabled, the voltage drop/rise is measured on the NS and PS pads using voltmeters.
Although the details of the power grid are not shown, approx. 20% of the routing
resources are used to define it, as would be typical of a high-performance commercial
power grid. Moreover, the metal wires defining the power grid are at least 3 times wider
than the minimum width, and via arrays (as supposed to single via) are used to connect
one metal layer to the next. The low resistance associated with these wires and via arrays
produces voltage drops in some experiments of 500 μV or less. Although our off-chip
instrumentation can measure voltage drops at high resolution (approx. 5 μV), these levels
will challenge the capabilities of on-chip ‘instruments’. We discuss solutions to these
issues and others as lessons learned in the following sections.

3.1.2 Test Chip Architecture: 65 nm chips
The 65 nm test chip architecture is shown as a block diagram in Fig. 3.3(a). A 50x80
array of SMCs are distributed, in close proximity, over a region that spans 560 m by 380
m. The power grid is wired in a mesh configuration over 10 metal layers using wide
metal wires and via arrays. The details of the SMC are shown in Fig. 3.3(b). Each
consists of a shorting inverter, a sense transistor and two scan FFs. The shorting inverter
draws approx. 1 mA and introduces a 5-10 mV drop on the V DD grid. The single sense
transistor allows only M1 voltages to be sensed. We refer to these experiments as PG65.
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 3.3: a) Block diagram of 65 nm chip and (b) details of the
SMC.

3.1.3 Challenge Scenarios
There are several 'challenge' scenarios possible in the PG90 and PG65 experiments. The
basic approach we take in our experiments is to enable the shorting devices within each
SMC, as well as the corresponding pass gates, one at a time, and then measure the
voltage drop/rise produced at each location. A bit in the digital response of our PG-PUF is
obtained by comparing two voltages obtained from a pairing of SMCs on a single bit.
In order to increase the size of the bitstring generated from the PG-PUFs, each of
these voltages can be compared with other voltages in various combination to produce a
bit string. We focus our analysis on bit string generated by using each voltage in (n-1)
comparisons, where n is the total number of voltages measured from one chip. Bit strings
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constructed in this manner are referred to as all combinations or AC.
As is customary, we randomize the order in which the comparisons are made. On
chip, this can be accomplished using an LFSR and a seed. The process is modeled in our
experiments using the functions srand (seed) and rand ( ) from the C programming
library. In order to show that the characteristics of the bit strings are insensitive to the
value of the seed, we report statistical results using 10 different seeds.
In addition to randomizing the order of the pairings, we found that periodically
inverting the comparison order within pairings produced better results. In particular,
inverting every group of three comparisons worked well for both the PG90 and PG65
experiments. For example, for a randomized set of pairing numbered 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, etc., pairings numbered 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, etc. are inverted. Note that the
inversion operation occurs after the randomization, which makes this process trivial to
implement on chip.

3.2 Experiment Techniques
3.2.1 Bias Issues
The voltage measured from the chips in our experiments consists of three basic
components: bias, regional variation and noise component. From the PUF perspective,
only the regional variation component is important, and the other two components
actually work to reduce randomness and stability, resp. Bias is a systematic voltage trend
that is introduced by, e.g., a non-uniform distribution of power port connections to the
power grid (the case for the PG90 chips) or non-uniform power grid mesh (the case for
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the PG65 chips). Any type of systematic voltage trend will produce bits that are biased to
0 or 1 across chips, and needs to be reduced or eliminated in practice. We first discuss the
biases that exist on our data sets and then methods of dealing with them.

Fig. 3.4: VDD profile using SMCs of a 90 nm chip.

Fig.3.4 show the voltage drop profile obtained from PG experiments on one of the
90 nm chips as each SMC is enabled. The voltage drop profile is derived from the M1
sense transistors on the VDD grid. The (x,y)-plane in the figure represents the position in
the array of the SMC in the 2-D array. From the bowl-like surface, it is clear that the
voltage drops are larger along the edges of the power grid than in the center. This
systematic voltage trend is caused by the non-uniform distribution of the power port
connections, which from Fig. 3.1 are located over the 'Design Macros' in the center
region of the chip, i.e., there are no power ports along the edges.
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Fig. 3.5: Voltage drops from 4,000 SMCs on a PG65 chip.
Although much less apparent, a small bias also exists in the voltage drop profile
shown in Fig. 3.5, which is derived from one of the 65 nm chips. Here, the voltage
differences computed for the SMCs are plotted for each of the 4,000 elements of the array
shown in Fig. 3.3. The majority of the voltage variations (approx. +/- 1 mV from Fig. 3.5)
is introduced by regional resistance variations in the metal defining the power grid.
However, a small 'saw-tooth-shaped' bias exists between adjacent rows of approx. 200
μV, which is introduced by a pattern in power grid metal mesh that is different for the
even and odd rows of the array. This subtle pattern is revealed by computing an average
voltage using the voltages measured across each row, for each of the 80 rows in the array.
Averaging reduces the random variations allowing the bias effect to be more easily
observed.
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Fig. 3.6 plots the average values on the y-axis for each row identified along the xaxis. It is clear that the average voltages are smaller for even-numbered rows, than for
odd-numbered rows. Moreover, the points labeled 'edge effects' reveal a second source of
bias that is introduced by the power grid architecture. In this case, the increase in the
voltage drops/rises is caused by the close proximity of these SMCs to the edge of the
power grid.

Fig. 3.6: Average voltage drops across 80 rows of PG65.

3.2.2 Dealing with Bias
There are several ways of eliminating the bias from the voltage measurements in these
chips. The multi-layered architecture of the SMCs used in the PG90 chips allow voltage
drops/rises to be computed across each of the metal layers. In order to reduce bias effects
and correlations that exist in the VDD and GND stack-ups, we compute inter-layer voltage
drops/rises, which can be computed by subtracting pair-wise, the voltages measured from
the consecutive metal layers, i.e., VM1-VM2, VM2-VM3, etc. These Voltage differences,
called power grid voltage difference (PGVD), also allow the PUF to leverage the
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independent resistance variations that occur in each of the metal layers of the power grid,
and given their differential nature, significantly reduces bias effects such as those
discussed in reference to Fig. 3.4. The bit string is then produced by comparing these
voltage differences, e.g., if VM1-VM2 in the VDD stack-up at SMC1 is greater than the
voltage VM1-VM2 in the VDD stack up at SMC2, then a '1' is generated, otherwise a '0'.
In the PG65 chips, each SMC has only one 'voltage sense' transistor connected to
the VDD grid, and therefore, computing inter-layer voltage drops is not possible. In this
case, we avoid the bias by restricting voltage comparisons between SMCs positioned on
every other row ( to deal with the “saw-tooth” effect) and eliminate those positioned
along the edges of the array (to deal with “edge effects”). In particular, we eliminate the
SMCs along the left and right columns, the bottom row and the top two row. This reduces
the size of the array to 77x48, and restricts comparisons between SMCs on the remaining
39 odd numbered rows and the 38 even numbered rows. We refer to this scheme as bias
avoidance.
We also propose a more general technique to eliminate bias which is applicable to
any type of PUF measurement, including, for example, RO frequencies and delays. For
PUFs based on voltage measurements, the method first divides the voltage drops by a
value that upper bounds the noise level. The general idea here is to eliminate the smaller
noise variations, effectively reducing the range of values observed in a set of repeated
samples for a given challenge to 1 or 2 distinct values. Once the voltage drops are redigitized, the remainder from applying a modulus is used in the comparison operation to
produce the bit. The modulus is chosen to preserve the regional (high frequency)
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variation while simultaneously 'trimming off' the bias effects present in the high order
bits. This approach is also applicable for PUFs that compare digital values, e.g., counter
values in RO-based PUFs. In this case, the modulus operation eliminate systematic,
across chip shift in frequency.

3.2.3 Bit Stability
In our experiments, we found that unstable bits, defined as bits that are susceptible to
'flipping' because their voltages are very similar, actually reduce several quality metrics
associated with the overall bit string, including inter-chip HD and NIST statistical test
results. Moreover, including unstable in the bit string requires the inclusion of error
correction and Helper data schemes, that weaken security and increase overhead.
An alternative scheme that is able to identify and discard unstable bits works as
follows. First, process is applied to determine the approx. noise level, either by using
measurements carried out after manufacture or by using an on-chip noise evaluation
process. In either case, noise levels can be determined empirically by applying a set of
challenges repeatedly and examining the stability of the bit strings produced. In cases
where bit flips occur, the magnitude of the difference between the voltages being
compared is used to determine a threshold, that defines an upper bound on the voltage
difference required to ensure bit stability. A safety margin is added to the threshold to
account for environmental variations that can occur later in the field.
The usage scenarios that enables this process to be applied where exact
regeneration of a bit string is required works as follows. During the initial bit string
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generation, the threshold method is used to identify the unstable bits. For each unstable
bit, its numbered position in the sequence challenges applied to generate the bit string
(for a given seed) is recorded in non-volatile memory. Later, during regeneration,
thresholding is disabled and the non-volatile memory is consulted to determine which
challenges to skip during bit generation. To further enhance protection against one-time
events, such as voltage spikes or scan configuration errors, repeated sampling and
majority voting can be used again in the regeneration process to arrive at a final bit string.
We investigate this process in the experimental results section below.

3.2.4 Statistical Characterization of the Bit Strings
Several statistical techniques are applied to evaluate the ‘quality’ of the bit strings
produced by the PG PUFs. Hamming Distance (HD) is defined as the number of bits that
are different when two bit strings are compares. An average inter-chip HD is compared
using all combinations of bit string from the chip population. The best result occurs when
exactly half of the bits from any two bit strings are different, i.e, when the HD, expressed
as a percentage, is 50%. An intra-chip HD is computed using all combinations of bit
strings obtained from one chip in the population, i.e., using the bit strings produced when
the challenges are repeatedly applied. An average intra-chip HD is computed by
averaging all of the individual intra-chip HDs. The ideal value in this case is 0%, i.e.,
each chip is able to reproduce the same bit string given the same set of challenges.
The statistical tests developed at NIST are also applied at significance level of 0.01
(the default) [1]. In general, the NIST tests look for 'patterns' in the bit strings that are not
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likely to be found at all or above a give frequency in a ‘truly random’ bit string. For
example, long or short strings of 0’s and 1’s, or specific patterns repeated in many places
in the bit string work against randomness. The output of the NIST statistical evaluation
engine is the number of chips that pass the null hypothesis for a given test. The null
hypothesis is specified as the condition in which the bit-string-under-test is random.
Therefore, a good result is obtained when the number of chips that pass the null
hypothesis is large.

3.3 Experimental Results
3.3.1 PG90 Experiments
We collected data from 60 copies of the 90 nm chips and generated bit strings using the
AC (all combinations) scenarios described in Section 3.1.3 . Although the SMC is
designed to sense voltages in any of the first 8 metal layers, the voltage drops above M 4
are smaller than those on the lower metal layers. This occurs because the metal wires in
the upper metal layers are much wider (and thicker) than wires in the lower portion of the
grids. Given the concern we expressed in Section 3.1.1 regarding the capabilities of onchip instrumentation, we restrict our analysis to voltages measured in the lower 4 metal
layers.
The focus of the PG90 experiments is on inter-layer resistance variations. Intermetal layer resistance variations can be captured by computing voltage differences
between consecutive metal layers. Since there are 8 TGs in the V DD and GND stacks as
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shown in Fig. 3.2, which indicating that 7 PGVD can be computed per stack. Given these
constraints, each chip generates 85 SMCs*3 metal layer pairings=255 PGVDs for each of
the VDD and GND stacks. The bit string is then produced by comparing these voltage
differences, e.g., if VM1-VM2 in the VDD stack-up at SMC1 is greater than the voltage V M1VM2 in the VDD stack-up at SMC2, then a '1' is generated, otherwise a '0'. We focus our
analysis on bitstrings generated by comparing each PGVD with all others generated using
the same metal layer pairing.Therefore, the total number of bits per chip is 85*84/2 per
metal layer pairing *3 metal layer pairing*2 grids=3,570*6=21,420 bits.These
experiments are referred to as PGVD or DIFF. For comparison purposes, we also carry
out a similar analysis using the absolute voltages (referred to as ABS). In this case, the
number of bits increases to 28,560 bits because there are 4 metal layers.
As indicated in Section 3.2.3 , our methodology eliminates unstable bits by
comparing the voltage difference of the pairing with a threshold. To increase confidence,
repeated sampling is also employed during bit stability evaluation. Therefore, for a bit to
be considered stable, the voltage difference must exceed the threshold in all samples. For
the DIFF experiments, a 25 μV threshold was sufficient to ensure that no bit flips
occurred for voltage pairings where the absolute value of the analog difference across all
samples (5 in this case) was larger than this value. The threshold increased to 50 μV for
the ABS analysis. Bear in mind that the threshold actually guards against voltage
variations as large as the threshold in each voltage of the pairing. For example, a voltage
pairing defined as (6.000 mV, 6.025 mV) in the first sample would need to vary to values
larger than (6.050 mV, 6.000 mV) in all subsequent samples to violate a 50 μV threshold
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model.
The distribution of the HDs for the ABS and DIFF analyses are shown in Fig.
3.9(a) and (b), resp. HD is plotted along the x-axis against the number of instances on the
y-axis.

(a)

(b)

Fig. 3.7: Distribution of HDs using (a) stable DIFF (M1-M4)
(b) stable ABS (M1-M4) bit strings from PG90 exps.
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The total number of the instances is given by all combinations of the chips’ bit
strings, i.e., 60*59/2=1,770. After removing unstable bits using to the algorithm
described above, the bit string sizes reduce by approx. 46% on average to 11,600 bits for
DIFF and by approx. 12% to 25,121 bits for ABS. The results are also shown in Table.
3.1. Bear in mind that these percentages do NOT represent the number of bit flips. The
actual average intra-chip HDs are 2.63% and 0.61%, respectively. The size of bit strings
used in the HD analysis are slightly smaller at 9,592 and 24,446 respectively. This
adjustment is necessary because the HD analysis must be carried out on bit strings of
equal length. To accomplish this, the chip with the shortest stable bit string is used to
define the length of all bit strings.

# of chips

Total raw
bitstring

Threshold
value

Average
survived rate
with
thresholding

Average stable
bitstring with
thresholding
scheme

DIFF

60

21420

25 μV

54.00%

11600

ABS

60

28560

50 μV

88.00%

25121

Table 3.1: Results for DIFF and ABS analyses with the
thresholding scheme for PG90 exps.
Although the number of bits discarded as unstable using the threshold method is
relatively large, the benefits of constructing a stable bit string in this fashion are
significant. First, the average inter-chip HD for DIFF improves from 38.2% (not shown
but with unstable bits included) to 49.97% as shown in the figure. For ABS, the
improvement is even more dramatic, from 8.4% to 49.79%. The results can be seen more
clearly in Table. 3.2. The superimposed Gaussian curve on the DIFF distribution of Fig.
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3.7(a) illustrates the distribution to close to ideal, and reflects the power of differential
analysis. The ABS distribution, on the other hand, is skewed somewhat to the left, which
indicates that a component of the bias discussed earlier in reference to Fig. 3.4 is still
present.
# of chips

Average interchip HD
without
thresholding

Average inter- Ideal inter-chip
chip HD with
HD
thresholding

DIFF

60

38.20%

49.97%

50.00%

ABS

60

8.40%

49.79%

50.00%

Table 3.2: Improvement of inter-chip HDs for DIFF and ABS
analyses with the thresholding scheme for PG90 exps.
Fig. 3.8 shows a bargraph of the number of passing chips (z-axis) for a subset of
the NIST tests (x-axis) using 10 different seeds (y-axis). Only those tests applicable to bit
strings of length 9,952 are applied. As indicated earlier, the best result is a ‘pass’ for all
60 chips. Although difficult to see, an ideal score of 60 was achieved in 40 (of the 90)
cases. The worst result occurs for the NonOverlapping Template test. The height of the
bars for this test represent the average number of passing chips across 148 templates.
Although the chips performed very well on this test overall, there are 37 cases (of a total
of 1,480) where the minimum number of passing chips was not met (57 is required
according to NIST). The smallest number of passing chips among these fails is 54, with
the majority (20) failing by only 1 chip. In a second set of seed trials (not shown) a
couple of other tests failed, e.g., Cumm. Sums test, but never by more than 2 chips.
Moreover, all of Pvalue-of-the-Pvalues tests passed, indicating the P-values are uniformly
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distributed between 0.0 and 1.0.

Fig. 3.8: NIST test suite statistics using DIFF (M1- M4)
stable bit strings in PG90 exps.

Fig. 3.9: NIST test suite statistics using ABS (M1-M4)
stable-bit strings in PG90 exps.
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In contrast, the results for ABS data shown in Fig. 3.9 reveal that the bit strings fail
the Runs and Approx. Entropy tests by as many as 50 chips in some instances. Overall,
these results indicate the bit strings generated from the DIFF (M 1-M4) version of the PG
PUF are of cryptographic quality.

3.3.2 PG65 Experiments
As described in Section 3.2.2 , the bias avoidance scheme pairs voltages from 39 oddnumbered rows + 38 even-numbered rows in all combinations to produce bit strings of
length 3,413,832 in the PG65 experiments. We repeatedly applied the challenges 10 times
to each of the 58 chips at 25 oC, and used a voltage threshold of 250 μV to eliminate all
bits in the repeated samples. As indicated earlier, only VDD voltages in M1 can be sensed
in the 65 nm chips, so the analysis is classified as ABS.

(a)
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(b)

Fig. 3.10: Distribution of HDs using (a) stable ABS (b) unstable
ABS bit strings from PG65 exps.

The distribution of the inter-chip HDs is shown in Fig. 3.10(a). The length of the
stable bit strings are 2,052,003 bits on average, which represents approx. a 40% decrease
in the original length. The results are summarized in Table 3.3.

ABS

# of chips

Total raw
bitstring

Threshold
value

Average survived
rate with
thresholding

Average stable
bitstring with
thresholding
scheme

58

3413832

250 μV

60.00%

2052003

Table 3.3: Results with the thresholding scheme for PG65 exps.
The intra-chip HD is approx. 1.2%, which indicates that a significant number of
bits that are discarded as unstable do not flip in any of the 10 samples. The benefits of
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discarding these bits are, once again, the improvements obtained in bit string quality and
the elimination of on-chip error correction hardware.
In order to illustrate the improvement in quality, Fig. 3.10(b) shows the distribution
of the inter-chip HDs using the full length 3,413,832-bit strings. The average inter-chip
HD drops from 50.0002% to 49.0851% when the unstable bits are included. Moreover,
the standard deviation of the distribution is significantly larger, e.g., 624 vs. 26,353.
The bargraphs in Figs. 3.11 and 3.12 give the NIST statistical test results for the
stable and unstable bit strings, resp. The results from all 15 NIST tests are displayed
along the x-axis, for 10 different seeds plotted along the y-axis. The ideal value is 58 for
all tests except NIST tests 12 and 132. A numerical analysis of the data indicates that 58
of the bars reach the ideal value in Fig. 3.11 while only 35 achieve this status in Fig. 3.12.
The stable bit strings pass all tests except for 7 (of a total of 1,480)
NonOverLapping Template tests. 6 of the 7 fails are by only 1 chip (54 chips passed
instead of the required 55) and 1 failed by 2 chips. In addition, 3 PValue- of-the-Pvalue
tests failed in this group of 1,480 tests. Moreover, three of the seeds passed every test.
Overall, these results indicate that the stable bit strings are high quality and can be used
in cryptographic applications.
The larger number of fails in the unstable bit string results of Fig. 3.12 indicate that
these bit strings are lower in quality. For example, only 1 seed passed the NIST
Frequency test, which measures the balance of ‘0’s and ‘1’s in the bit strings. Overall, 50
of the 150 (10 seeds * 15 NIST tests) fail. However, the fewest number of passing chips
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is 41, which is better than the worst case result obtained in the PG90 ABS M1-M4
analysis described in Section 3.3.1 .

Fig. 3.11: NIST test suite statistics using stable bit strings
for PG65 exps.

Fig. 3.12: NIST test suite statistics using unstable
bit strings for PG65 exps.
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3.3.3 Modulus Technique for Bias in PG65 Experiments
We investigate a second strategy for dealing with bias using a subset of the data from the
PG65 experiments where bias is particularly evident. In these experiments, we do not use
the bias avoidance scheme. The inter-chip distribution of HDs shown in Fig. 3.13(a) is
derived from the 4,000 SMCs paired with their ‘vertical’ neighbor. Bias is reflected here
in a lower-than-ideal average HD of 46.5% and in the bi-modal shape characteristic of the
distribution.
The distribution labeled ‘Modulus Op.” shown in Fig. 3.13(b) is derived using the
same pairings. The voltages in this case are first manipulated (as discussed in Section
3.2.2 ) by dividing by a noise threshold of 350 μV and then using the remainder from a
modulus operation (11 is used in this analysis) in the bit generation process. The removal
of the bias improves the average HD to 50.1% and re-shapes the distribution to conform
better to a Gaussian. Although this technique is effective, it is no substitute for a welldesigned architecture that minimizes bias. Fig. 3.13(c) shows the distribution obtained
when the bias avoidance scheme is used to illustrate this concept.
Note that the length of the bit strings is smaller (3,600) because of the pairing
constraints. Although the average HD is slightly less than ideal at 49.7%, the shape and
standard deviation of the distribution are both superior to those of Fig. 3.13(b).
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(b)

(a)

(c)

(c)
Fig. 3.13: HD analysis of bit strings using unmodified
voltages (a) with modulus op. (b) and using
bias avoidance (c) for PG65 exps.
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3.4 Conclusion
Two PUF implementations, which leverages resistance variations of the power grid, are
discussed and analyzed. Experimental results are reported for chips fabricated in 90 nm
and 65 nm technologies. A voltage threshold technique is investigated that eliminates
unstable bits and is shown to significantly improve inter-chip HD and the results from
NIST statistical tests. Both of these two PUF primitives are shown to generate
cryptographic quality bis strings of length upto 1.6M bits.
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Chapter 4
Stability Analysis of PG-PUFs with
Environmental Variations
In Chapter 3, all the experiments for the PG-PUFs were carried out under room
temperature (25oC). Actually, PUFs are sensitive to environmental variations and will
detract from their ability to generate the same signature (reproducibility or stability).
Since PG-PUFs leverage the passive component of metal resistance to generate bit
strings, theoretically, they should be less sensitive than other types of PUFs, i.e.,
transistor-based PUFs. In this section, we will carry out a series of experiments against
different temperatures and voltages to evaluate the stability of PG-PUFs. Therefore, the
main contribution of this chapter is focusing on determining the temperature and voltage
(TV) stability of PG-PUFs. A significant benefit of using metal structure is that “noiserelated” variations, such as those introduced by TV variations, result in linear changes to
the measured voltages. This linear scaling characteristic allows the relative magnitude of
two voltages to remain constant across changes in temperature and voltage, which, in
turn, improves the stability of the PUF to bit-flips, when compared, for example to PUFs
which leverage transistor-based PUFs.
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In our experiments, we evaluate the PG-PUFs at 9 TV corners, i.e., over all
combinations of 3 temperatures; -40OC, 25OC and 85OC, and 3 voltages; normal and +/10% of nominal. The evaluation is carried out on a set of chips fabricated in IBM's 90
nm, 9 metal layer bulk silicon process. The stability of the bitstrings is measured using
intra-chip HD and “probability of failure' techniques. Randomness and uniqueness are
also evaluated using the NIST test suite and inter-chip HD methods. A bit-flip avoidance
scheme is proposed and evaluated that reduces the probability of a failure to reproduce
the bitstring to less that 1E-9. We also investigate an on-chip voltage-to-digital converter
(VDC) and its stability across the 9 TV corners. This chapter is following the structure of
our paper [67].

4.1 PGV Experiments and Challenge Scenarios

Fig. 4.1: SMC schematic in 90 nm chips.
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The experimental setup in this chapter is still the same as described in 3.1.1 . Here,
I will give the SMC schematic of 90 nm chip again as shown in Fig. 4.1. For the
challenge scenarios, we still use the method of PGVD (or DIFF) presented in section
3.1.1 and 3.3.1 . As described in chapter 3.1.3 , each of the PGVDs can be compared
with other PGVDs in various combinations to produce a bitstring and can get 21,420 bits.
In the TV experiments, we also randomize the order in which the comparisons are made.
In an on-chip implementation, this can be accomplished using an LFSR and a seed.

4.2 Overhead
On the 90 nm chip, each SMC occupies an area of 684 μm2(38 μm x 18 μm), so the total
area occupies by the array of 85 SMCs is 684x85=58,140 μm2. The VDC occupies an
area of 145 μm x 63 μm. The size of on-chip memory to store the helper data is approx.
2,680 bytes. Generally, the equation 4.1 can decide how many bits for the helper data are
needed in order to remove the unstable bits with thresholding scheme.
# of bits of the helper data=# of bits (required bitstring size)*
(1/survived rate of the raw bitstring with thresholding scheme)

(4.1)

For the helper data needed for both thresholding and TMR schemes, the size
becomes 5 times of that for thresholding only, since the TMR-based bitstring of length n
requires approx. 5*n strong bits to construct. For example, with the thresholding scheme,
the survived rate of the raw bitstring is 35%; if a fixed-length bitstring of 256 bits is
desired, the helper data should be 256*(1/0.35)= 731 bits. For both thresholding and
TMR schemes, 731*5=3,655 bits are needed to determine the desired bitstring.
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4.3 Experimental Results
4.3.1 Bit Stability
In our TV experiments, there also exists the problem of bit flipping or unstable bits. We
still use the thresholding scheme to identify and discard unstable bits as described earlier
in 3.2.3 . As we know, thresholding is carried out by first computing a threshold from the
distribution characteristics of the PGVDs. The only difference is that in Chapter 3, the
threshold is used with a fixed value for both 90 nm and 64 nm technology, while the
threshold here is decided by using the percentage range of PGVD distribution. This is
illustrated using the GND and VDD PGVD distributions for a sample chip, CHIP1, in Fig.
4.2. Each distribution contains 255 PGVD values, derived as described in Section 3.3.1 .
The distance between the 10% and 90% points in the distribution is used to derive the
thresholds for the thresholding algorithm, which is approx. 0.3 mV for GND PGVDs and
0.15 mV for the VDD PGVDs for this chip. The limits at 10% and 90% are used to avoid
distortions caused by potential outliers in the PGVD values for each chip. This method is
more effective since the width of PGVD distribution of each chip is different. Using the
percentage range to derive threshold can make sure every chip can produce the close
number of strong bits.
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(a)
(b)

Fig. 4.2: CHIP1 GND and VDD PGVD distribution with
Gaussian curve fits and 10% and 90% thresholds.
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Fig. 4.3: CHIP1 GND PGVD differences computed for bit generation
during enrollment (a) and regeneration (b) at 9 TVs. Points
in upper portion of plots generate '1's, points in lower
portion generate '0's.
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The thresholds are then scaled by a constant to produce the actual threshold used
during bit generation. Fig. 4.3 provides an illustration of the bit generation process using
the GND PGVDs for CHIP1. Both graphs plot the bit comparison number along the xaxis against the value of the difference between the two PGVDs being compared. Only
the bits that survive the thresholding, called strong bits, are included in the plots, i.e., the
x-axis shows only about half of the 10,710 comparisons. Points that appear in the upper
portion of the figure generate a '1' bit while points in the lower portion generate a '0' bit.
Fig.4.3(a) shows only the points obtained from enrollment, which is carried out at
25oC, 1.2V. The thresholds are depicted using two horizontal lines at 0.11 and -0.11 mV
obtained from the distribution by a constant 0.37. In contract, Fig. 4.3(b) adds in the data
points from the remaining 8 TV (regeneration) corners, colored-coded to indicate the
temperature; green for 25 OC, blue for -40OC and red for 85OC. Close inspection reveals
that some of the data points from regeneration appear within the threshold band of width
0.22 mV, centered around 0.0. Noise that occurs during regeneration causes points to
move vertically, but as long as none move across the 0.0 line, no bit-flips occur.
The usage scenario that enables this process to be applied in situations where exact
regeneration of a bitstring is required works as follows. During the initial bitstring
generation, thresholding is used to identify the unstable bits. For each unstable bit, its
numbered position in the sequence of challenges applied to generate the bitstring is
recorded in public storage. Later during regeneration, during regeneration, thresholding is
disabled and the public memory is consulted to determine which challenges to apply
during bit generation.
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4.3.2 Statistical Characterization of the Bitstrings
The results of applying the thresholding techniques to 63 chips tested under 9 TV corners
are described in this section. An important concern regarding the thresholding technique
deals with the fraction of bits that survive it. In our experiments, we found this fraction to
be different for the GND and VDD stacks. On average, approx. 50% of the comparisons
using the GND PGVDs survive the thresholding, while only 20% of the comparisons
survive using the VDD PGVDs. The lower value for the VDD PGVDs analysis occurs
because of the increased noise levels on the VDD grid relative to the GND grid. As a
consequence, the average bitstring length reduces to approximate 7,765 (36.25%) bits
from the original size of 21,420 bits. These bitstrings are, however, reproducible at all of
the 9 TV corners.

Fig. 4.4: Distribution of HDs using stable bitstrings from 63
chips. Number of HD is 1,953 using bitstrings of
length 7,343 bits.
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The true average intra-chip HD, which is a measure of the underlying bit stability
across the TV corners, is computed as 4.01%. This value is obtained by analyzing the full
length, i.e., 21,420-bit, bitstrings with thresholding disabled and counting the number of
times a bit-flip occurs in each bit position across all pairings (9*8/2=36) of the bitstrings
produced under each of the 9 TV corners for each chip. The average intra-chip HD,
expressed as a percentage, is obtained by dividing the number of bit flips by 36*21,420,
which is the total number of bit pairings inspected for each chip, and multiplying by 100.
The value reported is the average of these percentages across all chips. Any value less
than approx. 5% is onsidered high quality according to the published literature on PUFs.
Inter-chip HD, as indicated earlier, measures the uniqueness of the bitstrings, where
the best possible result is 5%, i.e., on average, half of the bits in the bitstrings of any two
arbitrary chips are different. Fig. 4.4 plots the distribution of inter-chip HDs. The 1,953
HDs included in the distribution are obtained by pairing the stable bitstrings from all
chips under all combinations. The chip with the shortest stable bitstring is used to set the
size of the bitstrings used in each HD calculation, requiring all bitstrings to be truncated
to 7,343 bits. The average HD is 3,666.8 (49.94%), which is very close to the ideal HD of
3,671.5 (50.00%).
We also evaluate randomness using the NIST statistical tests at the default significance level of 0.01. Given the relatively short length of the stable bitstrings, only 11 of
the tests are applicable. The bar graph shown in Fig. 4.5 gives the number of passing
chips on the z-axis for each of the 11 tests on the x-axis, and for each of 10 different
seeds on the y-axis. The number of passing chips is in reference to passing the null
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hypothesis. The null hypothesis is specified as the condition in which the bitstring-undertest is random. Therefore, a good result is obtained when the number of chips that pass
the null hypothesis is large.

Fig. 4.5: Number of passing chips from NIST tests using 11
of the 15 applicable tests.

With 63 chips, NIST requirs that at least 60 chips produce a p value that is larger
than the significance level (α=0.01), otherwise the whole test is considered 'failed'.
Overall, of the 11*10=110 bars, 41 are full height indicating that all 63 chips passed the
test, 39 bars have height 61 have 2 have height 60. Therefore, 109 bars of the 110 are
equal to or larger than the required value to pass the test, and only 1 bars are below the
threshold at 58. Moreover, all but 8 of Pvalue-of-the-Pvalues tests passed, indicating the
P-values are uniformly distributed between 0.0 and 1.0. The fails in this category
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occurred in the Rank and Non-overlapping Template tests, both which NIST recommends
testing with much larger bitstrings than those used here. Overall, these all very good
results and indicate the bitstrings are cryptographic quality.

4.3.3 Bit-Flip Probability Analysis and Triple-ModuleRedundancy (TMR)
The large size of the bitstrings produced by the PUF can be used to further enhance their
reliability over that provided by thresholding alone. This can be accomplished creating 3
copies of a fixed-length bitstrings from the sequence of strong bits produced by the PUF.
The 3 copies can then compared as a means of detecting and correcting bit flips, in the
spirit of a popular scheme used in fault tolerance called triple-module-redundancy or
TMR. TMR is based on a majority voting' scheme in which the final bit for a given bit
position is obtained by taking the majority across all 3 copies of the bitstrings.
We investigate this technique using fixed-length bitstrings of 256-bits. A TMR-based
bitstrings is created during enrollment by coping the first 256 strong bits into the '1st copy'
of the fixed-length bitstrings as shown in Fig. 4.6. The second two copies are created by
parsing the remaining strong bits, searching for matches to the 1 st copy. As described
above for thresholding, the positions of the matching bits are indicated by writing a '1' in
the public storage bitstring, while the positions of the skipped bits (and the weak bits
encountered under thresholding) are indicated by writing a '0'. Later, during regeneration,
the public storage bitstring is consulted to determine which challenges are to be used to
re-construct the 3 copies of the bitstring. Once created, the final bitstring is obtained by
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majority vote on each column as shown in Fig. 4.6. This allows the correct bitstring to be
generated despite any single bit-flips that may occur in a column, such as the one shown
in the last column of 'Redundant BS1'.

Fig. 4.6: TMR process for bitstring regeneration.
In order to illustrate the improvement provided by TMR over voltage thresholding
alone, we iteratively decreased the GND threshold scalar given above as 0.37, in 0.01
steps down to 0.0. As the threshold is decreased, bit flips begin to occur in the
thresholding-only bitstrings. A Thresholding-only 'probability of failure' curve can be
constructed by counting the number of bit flips that occur in the bitstrings from all 63
chips and dividing it by the total number of bits. A similar curve can be constructed using
TMR, but in this case, a bit flip is not counted unless it occurs in 2 or more of the 3 bits
of a column as shown in Fig. 4.6. Moreover, the total number of bits used in the
denominator for the TMR-based curve is reduced by a factor of 3 to account for the
actual number used in the final TMR-based bitstring.
Fig. 4.7 plots to the data points for these two curves as well as two 'exponentialcurve' fits to them. The GND threshold scaling constant is plotted along the x-axis against
the probability of failure on the y-axis. The exponential curve fits allow the probability of
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failure to be predicted for thresholds beyond (to the right) of the last recorded bit flip in
our small population of chips. For example, the probability of failure using voltage
thresholding alone at the 0.37 threshold is 6.5E-7. This improves by over three orders of
magnitude to 2.4E-10 using the TMR-based scheme. Of course, the TMR-based scheme
can be expanded to further improve bit-flip resilience by generating 5 (or more copies) of
the bitstring, at the expense of increased usage of bits and public storage size.

Fig. 4.7: GND threshold scaling constant vs.
probability of failure (y-axis).

4.4 VDC experiments
The analysis presented in the previous sections is carried out on digitized voltages
obtained from an off-chip voltmeter. In this section, we analyze the bitstrings generated
by the PUF after digitizing the voltages using an on-chip voltage-to-digital converter
(VDC) that is subjected to the same TV corners as the PUF itself. The VDC is similar in
design to that described in [66] but is used in our application in a unique way.
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The architecture of the VDC is shown in Fig.4.8. The VDC is designed to 'pulse
shrink' a negative input pulse as it propagates down an inverter chain. As the pulse moves
down the inverter chain, it activates a corresponding set of latches to record the passing
of the pulse, where activation is defined as storing a '1'. A thermometer code (TC), i.e., a
sequence of '1's followed by a sequence of '0's, represented the digitized voltages.
The VDC works by introducing a fixed-width (constant) input pulse, which is
generated by the pulse generator shown on the left side of the Fig. 4.8. Two analog
voltages, labeled Cal0 and Cal1 connect to a set of series-inserted NFET transistors in the
inverter chain, with Cal0 connecting to NFETs in even-numbered inverters and Cal1 to
the NFETs in odd numbered inverters (see call-out on right side of Fig. 4.8). The
propagation speed of the two edges associated with the pulse are controlled separately by
these voltages. The pulse will eventually die out at some point along the invert chain
when the trailing edge of the pulse 'catches up' the leading edge. This is ensured by fixing
Cal0 at a voltage higher than Cal1. The digital representation of the applied Cal0/Cal1
voltages can then be obtained by counting the number of '1's in the latches.
As described earlier, PGVDs are created by subtracting the voltages measured on
consecutive metal layers in the power grid. Instead of digitizing these PGVs once-at-atime with the VDC and then subtracting them, we carry out the difference operation in
the analog domain by applying the two voltages from consecutive metal layers to the
Cal0 and Cal1 inputs. The larger PGV from the lower metal layer, M n, of the pair is
applied to Cal0 while the PGV from the adjacent, higher metal layer, M n+1, is applied to
Cal1 (voltage drops are used for the VDD grid voltages, e.g., VDD-VMn).
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Fig. 4.8: Voltage-to-Digital Converter (VDC). On the left side is off-chip
instrumentation that measures two voltages from the PG array, adds
and offset and programs the Cal0/Cal1 inputs of the VDC on the
right.
Fig. 4.8 shows how this is accomplished. The PG array is configured to enable the
PGV on Mn to drive the NS (or PS) pin and an off-chip voltmeter (VM) is then used to
digitize the value (some process as described for the original experiments). The PGV is
then multiplied by 15 and added to an offset, and the voltage sum is used to program an
off-chip power supply which drive Cal0. The exact same process is carried out for the
PGV produced on metal layer Mn+1 except the value is used to program a second off-chip
power supply which drive Cal1. The multiplication and offset operations are necessary
because the VDC requires the Cal0/Cal1 to be set between 500 mV and V DD for proper
operation.
Note that unlike the PGV experiments in 4.3, the on-chip VDC is subjected to the
same TV variations as the PUF (as would be the case in actual implementation), and
therefore its characteristics will vary as well. We developed a calibration process that
'tune' the offset voltage to compensate for some of the changes in VDC behavior but
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since the measurements are differential, the VDC is able to self-calibrate and cancel out
most of the adverse effects of TV variations by itself.
We carried out the same set of experiments and followed the same process as
described in Section 3 and 4 on the 63 chips. The results are as follows. The average
bitstring length after thresholding is 8,388 bits (39.16%) and the shortest one (used to
truncate the bitstrings from the other chips for the statistical tests) is 7, 506 bits. Both of
these numbers are slightly larger than the numbers obtained using the PGVs, as described
in Section 4.3.2 , and indicates that the VDC compensates for some of the TV variations
that occur in the measured PGVs.

Fig. 4.9: Distribution of HDs using stable bitstrings from 63 chips.
Number of HDs is 1,953 using bitstrings of length 7,506 bits.

On the other hand, the statistical test results for the VDC-based bitstrings are
slightly worse than those presented for the PGVs. Fig. 4.9 shows the HD distribution of
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the bitstrings and several statistical results, in the same format as Fig. 4.4 for the PGVs.
Although the inter-chip HD is close to the ideal at 49.87%, the value obtained for the
PGVs is slightly better (49.94%). Moreover, the standard deviation of 46.3 bits given in
Fig. 4.9 is slightly larger than that given in Fig. 4.4, primarily due to the long tail on the
left side of Fig. 4.9. The VDC-based bitstrings were tested using the same 11 NIST
statistical tests listed in Fig. 4.5, but using only the first seed. Although most tests were
passed, the Runs and Approx. Entropy tests failed with 57 and 49 chips passing, resp.,
and 20 of the 148 Non-Overlapping Template tests failed. From table 4.1, the difference
of experimental results for both PGV and VDC experiments are listed.

# of
chips

Total raw
bitstring

Average
survived rate
with
thresholding
scheme

Average
stable
bitstring

Shortest
stable
bitstring

Average
inter-chip
HD for
stable
bitstrings

PGV

63

21420

36.25%

7765

7343

49.94%

VDC

63

21420

39.16%

8388

7506

49.87%

Table 4.1: Results with the thresholding scheme for both PGV and
VDC experiments across 9 TV corners for PG90 exps.
In summary, the digitization process carried out by the VDC works well but is not
as efficient as the off-chip voltmeters at removing the bias that exist in the PGVs. In [67],
we show a 'bowl-shaped' pattern exists in the M1 voltages across the 2-D array of SMCs
and indicated that computing inter-metal layer voltage differences (as we do there)
effectively eliminates it. The basic problem with using the VDC to compute the analog
difference directly deals with the different sensitivities that exist for Cal0 and Cal1. In
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particular, Cal1 has higher sensitivities than Cal0, and therefore, the amplification factors
for voltages applied to Cal0 and Cal1 need to be different (we used 15 for both factors in
our experiments. The asymmetry in the sensitivities behaves as follows. Assume that the
Mn voltage from Fig. 4.8 increases by a fixed constant ΔV and the Mn+1 voltage remains
constant. Under these conditions, assume the TC for these two measurements is equal to
x. In contrast, a similar scenario where the voltage Mn remains fixed and the Mn+1 voltage
increases by the same fixed constant ΔV does not result in the same ΔTC. Instead, the
ΔTC is equal to y, where y>x. In other words, a delta change in the upper metal layer
(Mn+1) voltage has a larger impact on the change in the TC than it does for an equivalent
lower metal layer (Mn) voltage change. Therefore, the TCs weigh the voltage change in
the lower metal layer less than a change in the upper metal layer, which distorts their
relationship to the actual voltage difference.

4.5 Temperature-Voltage Stability Analysis
As stated in the earlier part of the thesis, leveraging metal resistance variations as the
source of entropy for the PUF should be inherently more stable across environmental
(TV) variations than leveraging transistor-based variations because metal resistance
scales linearly with temperature and voltage. The PGVs used in the analysis presented in
Section 4.1 actually include variation for both sources. Although the shorting transistors
from Fig. 3.2 are very large (57x minimum size) and therefore exhibit smaller variations
in comparison to minimum-sized transistors, they do introduce a component of entropy in
the PGV analysis. The entropy works to improve the results, but the gain is reduced, as
we show here, because of the increased sensitivity of transistor-based variations to TV
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variations (hereafter TV noise).
In this section, we eliminate transistor variations by dividing the PGV voltages by
the shorting current, and use the term PGERs, for power grid equivalent resistances, to
refer to them. In order to get as 'pure' a form as possible of the PGERs, we also subtract
the leakage voltage and leakage current from the values measured with the shorting
transistors enables. The expression for PGER is given by the following equation 4.2.

PGER=

V short −V leak
I short − I leak

(4.2)

The 4 measurements used to define the PGER each add measurement noise, which
we separate and distinguish in this analysis from TV noise through sample averaging. We
create PGER differences (PGERDs) by subtracting pairings of PGERs, as we did for
PGVs in Section 4.1.
The objective of our analysis is to show that the PGERDs are more resistant to TV
variations than are the PGVDs. In order to determine the magnitude of the TV variations
(or 'noise') we calibrate the PGVD and PGERD data. Calibration removes the DC offsets
introduced by TV noise in the data but preserves the variations. Calibration is carried out
by computing the mean PGERD and PGVD over the entire set of SMCs for a given metal
layer pairing and TV corner. Correction factors are then computed by subtracting the
mean value at each of the TV corners from a reference TV corner. The reference is the
data collected at 25oC, 1.2V. The correction factors are then added to the corresponding
data from the TV corners.
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Fig. 4.10: Subset of PGERD (top) and PGVDs (bottom) from M2-M3 metal
layer pairing for GND grid. Data from 9 TV corners is calibrated to
25OC, 1.2V. All 11 samples from 9 TV corners are also shown for
each SMC.
A subset of the calibrated M2-M3 PGERDs and PGVDs computed using data from
one of our chips as shown in the top and bottom plots of Fig.4.10 resp. The SMC number
is given along the x-axis and the PGERD/PGVD calibrated to 25 oC is plotted along the yaxis. Each plot shows 9 line-connected curves, one for each TV corner. Each point in the
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curves is the average of 11 samples (the samples are also plotted as unconnected points to
illustrate measurement noise). The averaging eliminates most of the measurement noise.
Therefore,variations in the line-connected curves are introduced primarily by TV noise.
The 3s values listed in the PGERD plot indicate that TV noise is approx. 2.7 times
the measurement noise (1.665/0.620). Bit flips occur when the slopes of the lines between
any two adjacent pairing of points reverses sign (see plots for examples). In contrast, the
ratio increases to 7.7 (23/3) for the PGVD analysis. Therefore, TV noise is nearly 3 times
more likely to introduce a bit flip in the PGVD analysis than in the PGERD analysis.

4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze the statistical quality of bitstrings produced by a PUF that
leverages resistance variations in the power grid wire of an IC. Experimental results are
reported for chips fabricated in a 90 nm technology, and which are tested under 9
different temperature-voltage corners given by the industrial standard specifications.
Voltage thresholding and TMR-based techniques are investigated as a means of
improving the bit-flip resilience of the regenerated bitstrings. An on-chip voltage-todigital converter is also investigated. The statistical results indicate that the power grid
PUF is able to generate cryptographic quality bitstrings of significant length.
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Chapter 5
Future Work

The experimental results given in Chapter 3 show that the bitstrings derived from metal
resistance variations perform very well on statistical tests, and can be used in both
identification and authentication. In Chapter 4, I apply different temperatures and
voltages in order to evaluate the stability of the PG-PUFs against environmental noise.
The experimental results also show that the proposed PG-PUFs are still feasible and can
be used for real applications. However, in order to make the PG-PUFs more attractive,
there is still plenty of work to do in the future. In this chapter, I will list several points
that we will focus on in the following research work. First, a more effective VDC and bit
generation engine will be developed on the new chip. Since the VDC circuit in Fig. 4.8
has the problem of susceptibility to differential power attacks (DPA), a new VDC circuit
is proposed as shown in Fig.5.1, which is more resistant to DPA and also avoid the
problem of different sensitivity described in section 4.4. Second, to make the PG-PUFs
get larger manufacturing variations and more entropy, the power grid of the nextgeneration chip will be designed using the minimum size of metal wires. Third, since in
our present experiments, we randomize the voltage comparisons using the software of C
programming. In the next chip design, the LFSR and seed will be integrated on the chip.
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5.1 Differential-Power-Analysis Resistant VDC
Besides the problem of different sensitivities for the VDC in Fig.4.8, there still exists
another problem, which is its susceptibility to differential power attacks (DPA). DPA is a
statistical technique that is used to steal secrets embedded within ICs. It works by
deducing internal states (and secrets) of the IC by analyzing power supply transistors that
are generated from operating a functional unit, such as the Advanced Encryption Engine.
The pulse-shrinking behavior of the VDC makes it relatively easy to determine the TC
code for a given voltage difference measurement. The power transient generated by the
VDC simply stops when the pulse shrinks and disappears and therefore, the length of the
power transient is proportional to the TC.
An architecture that addresses this issue is shown in Fig. 5.1. Here, the two GND
PGVs from the Mn and Mn+1 metal layers drive the even-numbered current starved
inverters within two identical delay chains, one shown along the top of the figure and one
along the top delay chain ahead of the rising transition introduced into the lower delay
chain. Given that the Mn+1 voltage is lower than the Mn voltage, the top delay chain
propagates the edge more slowly, and eventually, the edge propagating along the bottom
delay chain passes the top edges. Similar to the VDC in Fig. 4.8, as the edges propagate,
each record a '1' in a latch as long as it precedes in time the edge on the other delay chain.
Otherwise a '0' is stored. The duality of the delay chains causes complementary Tcs to be
stored in the latches, which are subsequently transferred to the scan chain. An example
test result is given in the center right of the figure which shows the complementary Tcs
that are produced when the bottom edge passes the top edge at the 3 rd latch.
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Fig. 5.1: Proposed differential-Power-Analysis (DPA) resistance VDC.

Although the VDC architecture is almost 2 times larger in area than the VDC
shown in Fig. 4.8, it provides a significant advantage. The power transient signature
remains constant when the bottom edge passes the top edge, so it is difficult or
impossible for an adversary to determine the precise time at which this occurred.
Although some information is revealed at the end of the power transient that reflects the
additional time taken by the top edge to propagate to the end of its delay chain relative to
the bottom edge, it requires higher signal-to-noise ratios when analyzing the power
transient to correlate it to the actual PGV voltages. Moreover, it is possible in this
architecture to introduce a 'stop condition' where the signal propagation is halted in the
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top delay chain, effectively eliminating this type of information leakage. For example, by
gating the VDD inputs on the top delay chain, it is possible to turn these inputs off at the
instant the bottom edge propagates off the end of its delay chain. This action halts the
propagation along the top scan chain (and the corresponding power transient) and
therefore 'hides' the difference in their delays.

5.2 An Improved Version of PG-PUF
An improved version of PG-PUF for a new chip will be designed, which will be
submitted for fabrication at MOSIS in 130 nm technology. The power-grid in the new
chip will be designed using minimum size metal and single via as a means of increasing
the magnitude of the resistance variations and voltage drops and rises.
In the PG-PUF design for the new chip, we will still use the same SMC structure as
in 90 nm technology. The main improvement of the new version PG-PUF is that we will
integrate some analog and digital components required in an IP-block implementing a
complete PUF system into the chip. These components will be added to next to SMC
arrays as shown on the right side of Fig. 5.2.
The Digital Challenge Generator generates the scan chain configuration bits to
enable SMC shorting inverters and voltage sense connections in one or more SMCs. The
voltage sense wires are routed to the Voltage Comparator and Perturbation unit, which
incorporates the analog-to-digital bit converter and bit stability control. The PUF Engine
serves to coordinate the activities of the PUF IP-block components and acts as the
interface to high level applications which request PUF signature bits.
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Fig. 5.2: PUF IP-block (blue circles represent SMC arrays).
The proposed Voltage Comparator and Perturbation unit is shown in Fig.5.3. It
consist of an OpAmp array that compares two sense wire voltages on PS 1 and PS2 as
shown or on NS1 and NS2. The outputs of OpAmps are a a digital '1' if PS 1>PS2, or '0'
otherwise. The individual bits from each of the OpAmps in the array are collected in scan
FFs and compared using a 'voting scheme' (not shown). The voter tallies up the responses
and decides if the comparison generates a '1' or '0' PUF signature bit. The array of
OpAmps and the voting scheme are designed to reduce the adverse effect of biasing
offsets in the OpAmps themselves.
A critical component of (any) PUF system is a scheme to distinguish between
stable and unstable bits. The voting scheme described above can be used to evaluate bit
stability. For example, the voter may decide that the bit is unstable of the number of '1's
produced by the OpAmp array is not larger by margin than the number of '0's, or vice
versa. A second, complimentary scheme is shown in Fig. 5.3. A set of perturbation
transistors are added to each SMC, that function to introduce a small dynamic voltage
perturbation, either on the power grid as shown or on the voltage sense wires
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themselves. The voltage variations introduced will cause the output of selected OpAmp
to flip between '0' and '1' in cases where the voltages being compared are very similar.
The glitch detector shown in the lower right of the figure is designed to detect the bit flip
using an XOR gate and an SR-latch. The 'stability-indicator' output of the SR-latch will
remain a '0' if the bit is stable and '1' otherwise.

Fig. 5.3: Voltage Comparator and Perturbation circuit
for on-chip bit stability evaluation.

The PUF engine collects the sequence of bits generated, partitioning the bit string
into stable and unstable bits based on the stability evaluator(s). The stable bits represent
the 'repeatedly random' group and can be used for authentication and encryption keys,
while the second group is not repeatable and can be used for one-time pads and other
applications that require a true random number. We plan to build the entire PUF system
on a custom ASIC for experimental evaluation.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Two implementations of a PUF based on the resistance variations of metal wires are
presented. Experiments are carried out on two sets of chips, one set fabricated in IBM's
65 nm SOI technology and another fabricated in IBM's 90 nm bulk technology. The
results show that metal resistance variations that occur in the power grid are able to
produce bit strings that perform well under HD and NIST statistical tests. Both of these
two implementations are shown to generate cryptographic quality bit strings of length up
to 1.6M bits. Experiments are also carried out across different temperatures and voltages
in order to evaluate the stability of PG-PUFs in 90 nm technology.
In Chapter 1, I described the importance of exploiting PUFs for security
applications and introduced the advantages of PG-PUFs which leverage the resistance
variations of the power grid of chips.
In Chapter 2, I briefly introduced the development of concepts of PUFs, and
introduced the extensions of PUFs; Also, I listed several popular PUFs published in
recent years and described the applications of PUFs. Finally, I gave some methods of
evaluating the quality of PUFs and ways of improving the stability of PUFs.
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In Chapter 3, I proposed two primitives of PG-PUFs. One is based on the
technology of 65 nm. The PG-PUF for this technology can only measure the voltage from
one metal layers. In order to increase the entropy and size of the bitstrings generated from
our PG-PUFs, I proposed another primitive based on the 90 nm technology, which can
measure the voltage from 8 metal layers of the power grid. By this way, the voltage
difference between two consecutive metal layer, which can eliminate the bias of the
power grid, can also be compared. The statistical results indicate both of these two
primitives can produce cryptographic quality bit strings of significant length.
In Chapter 4, I applied different environmental parameters to the PG-PUFs of 90
nm technology in order to evaluate the stability of them. In the experiments, I used the
temperature of -40oC, 25oC, 85oC and the +/-10% of the nominal supply voltage and
combine them into 9 TV corners. And then I carried out a series of measurements across
these 9 TV corners. The statistical results show that the bitstrings generated from the PGPUFs can still be used for cryptographic applications during different environment.
In chapter 5, I described the many facets of future work. I found some problems
existing in the present VDC circuit structure: one is its susceptibility to DPA; another one
is the different sensitivities that exist for Cal0 and Cal1. Therefore, I proposed a
complementary VDC structure which can fix both of these two problems. I also proposed
an improved PG-PUF structure for the next version chip design. In the new power grid
structure, the minimum size of metals will be used, which will be expected to have larger
manufacture variations and increase entropy. Finally, I presented my idea of integrating
the LFSR and seed on to the next chip design.
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